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1 Craig Oliver was David Cameron’s Director of Politics and Communications and this part
diary, part memoir fly-on-the wall account of the six months that led up to the Brexit
takes readers to the heart of the Remain campaign as it unfolded on a day to day basis.
Oliver’s presence beside the Prime Minister, often from dawn to dusk, sheds an extremely
intimate light on the way the British government dealt with the referendum and given
the tight schedules that the main actors had, it is worth wondering how the author found
time to write this book at all. Craig Oliver is definitely on the “Remain” side and feels that
“Leave” based their campaign on deceit and a series of untruths that the different medias
- and most disappointingly the BBC - let them get away with. Through it all, Oliver shows
utter devotion to his boss and the Remain camp’s patriotism, underlining the fact that
leaving the EU has been a nagging antagonism for decades: it just reared its ugly head
during Cameron’s watch and he was brave enough to deal with it. 
2 The book opens with the climax to the referendum vote and then returns to a month by
month account – each one being broken down into subparts to capture the spirit  of
events – of the six-month period from January to June 2016. Oliver’s overarching thesis is
that the Leave campaign managed to latch on to the 3 million voters who are unreachable
by  any  reasonable  campaign,  but  who  are  quite  willing  to  punish  the  political
establishment at the drop of a hat. They were thus quite ready to lap up the dodgy Leave
propaganda peddled by the vociferous tabloids and their visceral wariness of politicians
was exacerbated by the rift between top members of the British cabinet. The “Stronger
In” campaign failed to see this and remained faithful to a form of deontology that made
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them  feel  good  about  their  work  but  deprived  them  of  the  opportunities  to  make
sufficient inroads into their rivals’ demolition work. By playing too much by the book,
opponents were simply not nailed as they could have been for backing up the Leave
campaign's most questionable statements. Nor were they questioned enough about their
post referendum ambitions including the possibility that they were quietly forming an
alternative government ready to take over when Cameron left. 
3 Craig Oliver devotes considerable space to the issue of collective cabinet responsibility
which was waived during the campaign, but only after renegotiation. It was essential that
the government be seen to be docking clearly with one side – or the other – of  the
campaign,  but  disagreement  within the cabinet  gave the overall  impression that  the
whole thing was an absurd shambles. All in all, n°10 comes across as being unprepared for
the referendum given the utter amazement expressed by the author that some cabinet
members should suddenly turn their coats and be disloyal to the Prime Minister. Yet the
referendum was never designed to be about Cameron hence his early statement that he
would not stand down should Brexit win. Oliver continually underlines Cameron’s highly
motivated personal contribution to the course of events and his fear that the campaign
could have been blown off course because of the “Blairmore” affair is palpable. Cameron’s
team could only look on helplessly as Iain Duncan Smith chose to resign ostensibly to
state his case about planned benefit cuts while Michael Gove, the Prime Minister’s close
friend, was portrayed as being even more cut throat by playing an elegantly despicable
role in the leave campaign. 
4 In the meantime, Boris Johnson could easily have bumbled his way into the Remain camp
given that he constantly gave the impression of not really wanting to leave the EU and
that come what may, there would always be room to repair Brexit. Or perhaps Johnson
and his supporters believed that with the threat of Brexit looming even larger, Europe
would come running to offer even better conditions than those negotiated by Cameron in
January? Remaining was portrayed as a sign of weakness whereas leaving showed the
romantic strength of convictions and that Britain could and should stand up for herself as
she had done in a not such a distant past. Yet for Craig Oliver and the Prime Minister’s
team,  there  was  no  doubt  whatsoever  that  Brexit  would  not  lead  to  any  further
negotiations and it was up to them to get this message across. They emphasised the “leap
in the dark” that  Brexit  would entail  whereas Bremain quite clearly meant reducing
bureaucracy, protecting the pound and reducing benefits to make Britain less attractive
for migrants, to name but a few advantages it had to offer. Yet in doing so, they attracted
even more attention to these issues, as if the EU could be reduced to them and very little
else. 
5 Unpreparedness went beyond the rift  within the Cabinet as the author explains that
when the referendum was called in January for June, this left only six months to explain
to voters the intricacies of the European Union. More time could have avoided polarising
the debate on such simple issues as migrants, asylum seekers and welfare. Far too much
headline  attention  was  paid  to  them  thus  maximising  their  publicity  during  the
campaign.  If  debate had begun in 2013 when the referendum was first  promoted by
Cameron, the government would have been able to devote far more time to coaxing the
British public into a better relationship with Europe. As things stood, by hinging the
referendum round the renegotiation deal, time was short and the simpler issues could
more easily be thrust to the fore. In light of this, the “out” campaign had a far clearer
message to deliver on British sovereignty, whereas “in” was seen to be fudging things by
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trying to have the best of both worlds: the economic advantages of remaining in the EU
while remaining out of the Eurozone - and thus being less affected by potential bailouts -,
and the Schengen “no borders” agreement. The message was sincere but not clear enough
for an electorate that  contained enough disappointed voters ready to pounce on the
slightest signs of weakness to punish rather than support.
6 Craig Oliver dwells on the Labour Party’s contribution to the campaign and highlights
their lukewarm support for Remain. This was partly due to internal weaknesses caused by
their highly contested leadership providing yet another quandary for Cameron: to what
extent could he continue to berate his political opponent while expecting him to provide
support for staying in the EU and above all get Labour voters to turn out? Jeremy Corbyn
was faced with his own conflict of loyalties given that a Tory war could only improve
Labour’s chance of returning to power. But, at the same time, his political duty was to
back Remain without giving the impression that he would not be averse to seeing the
campaign veer  towards a  wider  referendum used to assess  the government’s  record,
especially in light of the austerity measures it had implemented. Oliver explains just how
nerve racking it had become to keep a tight control over communication – his speciality –
within the rainbow coalition that the government was indeed seeking so hard to maintain
between Labour, the Liberal Democrats, the Greens and the TUC even without the added
problems of infighting within the Conservative Party that would more than likely depress
turnout to the advantage of Leave. Rumours that the Queen backed Brexit were also a
serious mishap but  they were counterbalanced to some extent  by President  Obama’s
making it quite clear that the United States would prefer to deal with a block rather than
an individual country.
7 Obama’s visit was indeed deemed to be a watershed moment in the referendum campaign
but as the date drew nearer, it seemed as if the two campaigns had been whittled down to
a straight contest between immigration on the leave side, and the economy on the other.
Remain tried desperately to make its case that dealing with immigration by crippling the
economy was ludicrous and for a few days, this argument seemed to hold enough water
for victory to seem possible.  The tragic murder of MP Jo Cox meant a suspension of
campaigning and a deal of soul searching into what the referendum was really all about
but Oliver simply reminds readers that given the overall context, no one really knew how
to react to her death.
8 One  of  the  most  interesting  sections  of  the  book  is  devoted  to  Oliver’s  personal
conclusions after the Brexit decision and a breakdown of the statistics. He felt his side
had not had a credible enough answer to immigration which gave angry voters ample
opportunity to express their instinctive dislike of the EU. The referendum was also a
proxy to express anger at a whole swathe of issues many of which had nothing to do with
Europe all the more so as public relations had been insufficient to steer people away from
the nonsense that was peddled relentlessly by a large part of the press.  His side had
lacked a core message possibly because of the difficulty they had had in bringing together
so many different partners under one banner. Lastly, Bremain’s arguments were far less
convincing quite simply because there were politicians behind the decisions who are
mistrusted  by  the  voting  public.  On  the  other  side,  Brexit  had  a  core  message  and
according to Craig Oliver, they lied.
9 Unleashing Demons can almost be read as a political thriller given that nearly every page
holds its own anecdote, event, episode or story. It’s an exciting read if you are interested
in the  fine  details  of  just  how  frantic  government  machinery  became  during  the
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referendum campaign. Yet Craig Oliver’s devotion vis-à-vis his boss prevents him from
asking some of  the  fundamental  questions  that  he  could  have at  least  attempted to
answer beginning with why organise a referendum in the first place given that there was
a distinct possibility that it would produce such a momentous decision in the history of
Great  Britain? To justify the course of  events by suggesting that  it  was quite simply
Cameron’s call and he made it is unsatisfactory but Oliver is a spin doctor and this book is
about spin. The real issues at stake are buried beneath the communication skills of those
involved and readers are literally swamped with names of people whom they know next
to nothing about. The spin and namedropping may be somewhat overwhelming but the
insights  into how n°10 dealt  with the referendum campaign on a  daily  basis  for  six
months mean that this book is a valuable read not only for scholars of European studies
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